Quadsville

Posted by: Jenius on June 18, 2008 10:51AM EST I'll start. In most cases (military or civilian), the proper course would be to voice your opinion within and try to change or improve the policies. If you disagree with the final decision, you either leave or obey. The caveat to that would be in a 'whistleblower' situation, where you see things that are illegal, unethical, etc., and feel the need to go outside the chain of command or, if you feel it is dangerous enough, to the press. I don't remember the Fallon details. Was he giving a talk when he mentioned his disagreements? It's hard to say that he was right or wrong, given this administration's disturbing history of getting rid of people who express different opinions from the party line.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 18, 2008 12:23PM EST The details on Fallon are highlighted in the Esquire article. It's a good read. Thanks for the thoughts, Jenius!

Posted by: Anne-Marie Hislop on June 18, 2008 7:09PM EST Interesting question. I think that a military officer owes a certain loyalty in addition to the fact that it is career suicide to not be faithful, so I would not see going to the press as an early option. Hopefully, he/she has an internal moral code with lines that he/she will not cross even if it costs a career, reputation etc (we all should have such an internal moral code - some things should be unacceptable to us no matter the cost). That said, obviously what to do in opposing a policy would depend upon where it falls in relation to those core values. Assuming whatever it is does not cross swords with that internal nonnegotiable code, my first preference is working within the system. For one thing, that is the only way we may actually change or modify the system. When I was in the Navy our chief Nurse, a Cdr issued an order saying that all corpsmen would be removed from pediatrics and the femal wards - only corpswaves would work on those wards. As the charge nurse in Pediatrics I felt it was important to have that male influence around for children whose daddy's were often at sea. So, I went to her office and made the case - she reversed her order in relation to pediatrics. If working within the system gets nowhere, then it seems to me that the course of action would depend of what the issue was, how profoundly one feels about it, and whether or not one is compromised by not doing something. There is something in me that does not see going to the press as a very desirable option - but then I never was a senior officer (ltjg was as high as I got).

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 18, 2008 11:12PM EST AMH-- Just to toss a different angle to the conversation... It doesn't have to be the press. In the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, there was strong concern amongst military planners, generals & admirals about how many troops would be needed. The vast amount of intellectual research, war-gaming and simulations, etc, indicated that upwards of 350,000 troops would be needed...not just for the combat, but to secure the country. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Perle and company all pooh-poohed that number as nonsense. Of course, none of them had any real military experience with such planning. General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army before the 2003 war, was put on the spot by Congress. During congressional testimony, he was directly asked what he thought an adequate number of troops would be. He responded honestly, that he thought 300+ thousand would be required. He had his pink slip almost as soon as he got back to his desk at the pentagon. He was put in a tough situation, where congressional lawmakers demanded answers. Shinseki has been accused of not being vocal enough, and also the converse, of subverting the administration's agenda.

Posted by: John T Moeller on June 19, 2008 12:19AM EST I see the concern that Shinseki had about numbers, however I wonder if the administration had told the truth about how many warriors they would need. Would Congress have supported any Iraq related intentions? Wasn't Rumsfelds original (buzz) he wanted to rehape the military, so that they could "drop in" anywhere in the world, meaning reliance on an airborne tactical American Force drop? I'm not saying Bush was right or wrong as commander in chief, but in a long protracted anti-terrorist war, does a Commander have the right if possible to pick the field of battle. for example sand over mountains? I realize Iraq soverignity is an issue however.... I finally had a chance to see the DVD "Truman" this week and the Key words of the early 40's were Korea, Japan, Israel, and Iran. And many though Truman "had it all wrong" also, with his very low public approval.

Posted by: Mike Olson on June 19, 2008 12:58AM EST This is, of course, a whole different ball of wax than any enlisted person faces. If your in your in. Raising questions is nothing but boat rocking. I recall a couple of single parents who would have left the military had they been given a real option. When they tried to bring it up in a war time situation they were asked why they hadn't brought it up previously(they had, but were given no official record and counselled they could get a BCD) As far as flag officers go, I think generally the dissenters handled as best they could. Meaning, you don't go to the press, you attempt to influence things as best you can, ultimately if your advice is not taken, resign. There is little else they can do. Although this is not our situation Yamamoto was given a bad bill in that he felt attacking the U.S. was a bad move. Ultimately realizing that it would happen with or without him, he planned an attack he felt would most likely succeed. He was forced to gamble on a losing hand. Our Generals & Admirals were in a similar situation in which military victory was assured. Diplomatic victory,international good will and a stable regime change were not. Not too mention the potential to create greater terroristic threats.

Posted by: Jenius on June 19, 2008 11:29AM EST It's a tough situation for people like Fallon and Shinseki - what do you do when you disagree with your leaders or, worse, if you believe that they are not being honest with the public. It's easy to say "suck it up or leave", but these, as well as others down the line, are people with honorable careers that outlast good and bad administrations. The Shinseki case seems a little more straightforward. I don't see any circumstances where he should lie under oath. It's another black mark on this administration that he was essentially fired for telling the truth.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 11:44AM EST JTM-- The Commander and his staff are responsible for the planning and assessment of military operations. Ultimately, the Commander in Chief has final say. In this administration, there were only two senior officials with senior military experience: Powell and Armitage. Both are now gone. Both understood the complexities and requirements of an occupation. Mike-- Yep, the way you handle such this differs depending on your rank & paygrade. Jenius--Great comments. You're right, there is a track record of the current administration to stifle any dissent, whether it be internal or external.

Posted by: John T Moeller on June 19, 2008 12:09PM EST Jenius : "It's easy to say "suck it up or leave", but these, as well as others down the line, are people with honorable careers that outlast good and bad administrations."...... I think we would all agree, thiis could also apply to a Deere employee with 15 years seniority and a family to feed. In the end a lot will depend on how much failure you can live with if a person did go public, but you also drag along family and friends when speaking out turns political in or out of the Armed Forces....Good morning all!

Posted by: Sanity on June 19, 2008 1:57PM EST There seem to be several observations or underlying questions, but first off I will admit I admire but lack the military discipline regarding chain of command, authority, etc. I am too inquisitive in the public sector to not question decisions by 'management', also because of the 'fly by the seat of our pants' style I've witnessed in the public sector. But anyway, There is a difference between high level decisions and low level implementation of those decisions. If the one who has to implement the solution does not agree with the solution, what to do? I don't like the 'use the media'. Unless one is completely sure how wrong something is, using the media seems like 'crying just to get your own way'. But it is hard to keep ones mouth shut. Stepping aside may save you from personally being responsible for the fall out. Overall, I think it more valuable for the right person to stay in the position to deal with the problems they foresee will happen, rather than turn it over to who doesn't see the problem or maybe doesn't recognize the problem once it happens. Does that make sense? I am often confronted with 'solutions' that have known problems. At times, I know a job will get done, even though I knew how to get there 'easier'. But these experiences have nothing to do with lives and mucho money. I don't think I could make those kind of decisions. Side question: How much criticism was there about Fallon before it came to this point? I mean, were there any articles as flattering about Fallon before it came to a point of butting heads with Bush? This is more of my theoretical "How do you recognize the 'great' guys before it is too late" I'm still reading the article but wanted to get started here. I am at a loss on the "getting fired for telling the truth" but I haven't fully formed my questions on that point. Maybe later

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 2:04PM EST JTM-- Good point, and I'd certainly apply that to junior and mid grade military members. When it comes to flag & general officers, they're well beyond the 20-year mark, and can retire with their pensions...and they usually don't have any problem finding employment. For a bit more historical context: In October, 1990, the CENTCOM staff under GEN Schwarzkopf had planned & war-gamed for potential offensive operations into Kuwait vs. the Iraqi army. Schwarzkopf was unhappy with the results, because it necessitated an up-the-middle attack into Kuwait. Schwarzkopf and his planners had envisioned the "left hook," in which a large force would rapidly cut across open desert, and cut east, cutting the Iraqis off at Basrah. The only problem: He'd need an entire extra corps to do it. That mean roughly doubling the size of the existing force at the time in Saudi Arabia to about 500,000 troops. Schwarzkopf presented the idea to Powell, and they were unsure of what political and domestic impact that might have. With a bit of trepidation, they did the right thing, and presented the request to Pres. Bush (Sr). Bush the elder didn't bat an eye, and said, "ok." Bush was loathe to second guess his 4-star experts, or hamstring them in their duties, and was interested in making sure they had everything they needed. On the flip side, there's Rumsfeld. He wanted to apply the same tactics used in Afghanistan to Iraq...small, special forces supported by air power. Problem is that Iraq is NOT Afghanistan. Rumsfeld uses a business model, looking at efficiency, and doing the job with the least amount of stuff required. That might work in corporate America, but it doesn't work well in Military operations, where the unpredictable nature of human beings comes into play. A Commander must always prepare for what we call "branches and sequels" to the operation. After all, the enemy gets a vote.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 2:08PM EST Sanity-- Fallon is no wimp. He's a true warrior, has seen plenty of combat himself, and is an imposing figure. He also has a keen mind, and understands the increasing need of proactive diplomacy, engagement, and establishing relationships. In Fallon's view, if we come to the point of needing to use force, we've failed in our deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance tasks. Sun Tzu, one of the greatest military minds ever to have lived, remarked that "The ultimate excellence is to defeat the enemy without fighting."

Posted by: Mike Olson on June 19, 2008 2:11PM EST My point with the Yamamoto comment was pretty simple actually. He believed the Japanese would lose if they went to war with the Americans. However, others felt American embargo's were so disrupting their war effort they had no choice. His ultimate decision to plan the attack was based on his opinion of how to best serve the national interest. He was the best they had, so he planned the best he could, but knew if they didn't win in 6 mos, they would ultimately lose... I am not trying to get lost in hx. Any flag officer has shown a concern for his countries interest. Only he can really determine given his position how that is best done. He may spend decades looking like the goat. But, he ultimately has to decide whether his strategic abilities with force best serve the country or whether it is best to resign and allow the voting public to instill a new governing body after enough blood has been shed. It becomes a question of quantity. Do you save lives by staying or do you save lives by going...Obviously, that means American lives.

Posted by: Anne-Marie Hislop on June 19, 2008 8:22PM EST I agree that being called to testify under oath requires the truth. What has been said about risking career, retirement, and future choices is valid. My belief is that one should have some nonnegotiables (lines we won't cross) no matter the cost to us. That said, I do think that the first option is to work within the system. I read some of the article on Fallon (didn't have time to read all). He sounds like an amazing man - what I did not understand is whether he was doing his ordinary job or whether he was doing diplomacy work because no one else was doing it. [Obviously the article is very anti-administration biased, which should be kept in mind in evaluating it - whether we agree with that perspective or not].

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 8:45PM EST AMH-- As the CENTCOM Combatant Commander, he was in charge of U.S. Military affairs in the entire CENTCOM region. The meeting-and-greeting, diplomacy and face time with foreign leaders and military officers is an expected duty for a 4-Star that has one of the regional commands in our system. Originally, he'd planned to retire following his tenure as the Pacific Command (PACOM), but the SECDEF asked him to do one more tour, and take the CENTCOM job.

Posted by: robertF on June 20, 2008 11:21AM EST The problem with Flag Officers (Generals too), they are used as political tools. I was in Germany after the Ahbu Garaeb (sp) and I got to meet and train with Sanchez. He was an awesome personnality and generally liked by his troops. He was thrown under the bus. I look forward to reading his book. We knew in our planning process (battalion leve) we were short on people. Once we arrived in Kuwaitt we were supposed to get two Reserve Units attached to us.

Posted by: Michael Burt on June 20, 2008 12:35PM EST It's interesting that not once has Crocker or any civilian been mentioned, yet 90% of the battles lost or yet to be won are diplomatic & societal, not military. Maybe this is why the Bush Administration has failed to get any movement from the Iraqi Government. Near as I can tell, Adm Fallon did his job as best he was allowed to. So it was/is with most from bottom to top, IMO. The political roadway is made of bodies thrown under the humvee.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 20, 2008 12:44PM EST Robert-- Thanks for your input! Funny you mention Sanchez. I'd agree, he was a victim of circumstance and poor planning. By all accounts, he was a great division commander. I've never met him personally. Here's an excerpt from the book "Fiasco," written by Thomas Ricks. It highlights what you said about "being thrown under the bus." "...Sanchez was placed in the middle of an extraordinarily difficult and tangled command situation. In other U.S. occupations, the commander had been a four-star general, such as Doublas MacArthur in postwar Japan, and Lucius Clay at the same time in Germany. Sanchez was a three star--that is, a lieutenant general--and in fact the most junior one in the U.S. Army. He jumped from commanding a division of fewer than 20,000 troops to leading a combined U.S. and Allied force of about 180,000 men and women. And in doing so he was woefully undersupported--the Pentagon calculated that he needed a headquarters staff of 1,400 but during 2003 he was given a fraction of that, at one point hitting a low of just 495. "The whole staffing of CJTF-7 (the new name for Sanchez's command, the top U.S. military headquarters in Iraq) at the time was completely inadequate," said an Army colonel who worked with it in Iraq and later, while at the Army War College, studied its troubles. "Putting a division commander in charge of a corps [a group of divisions, support units, and staffs], then giving him responsibility for a whole country in the throes of an insurgency, multinational forces, an army corps, a MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force], et cetera, with the staff for a single corps was too broad a mandate. No commander with Sanchez's experience level and resources should have been saddled with this responsibility." That understaffing was symptomatic of a far larger problem: Sanches was working for a chain of command [read Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith] that was laboring under a series of false assumptions about postwar Iraq, and that didn't understand the situation it was facing, so it was consistently underestimating the difficulties it faced, and the resources it would need to devote to the problem. On top of that, he was burdened by a jerry-rigged command structure, in which there was no one American official, civilian or military, on the ground in Iraq in charge of the overall American effort. Rather, both Sanchez and Bremer reported up to Rumsfeld, who was at the Pentagon, some 7,000 miles away. (End Quotation) I think Ricks' analysis is accurate. Rumsfeld's construct violates one of the cardinal rules and universal principles of military operations: Unity of Command. This brings me back to my original point, that many of these decisions are not made by senior officers, but politicians. So, as a general or admiral, what do you do when your boss' plan is poorly inept?

Posted by: robertF on June 20, 2008 2:29PM EST A lot of people don't understand the whole command thing. In fact all "commanders", Division and higher can and do report directly to the POTUS. The Sec Def isn't their boss. The Joint Cheif of Staff, has no authority to conduct any decissions for the services. In fact the joint staff is only a few dozen people. We had a great Kernal when I was deployed. He thought the "Rules of Engagement" were crap and basicly told us, "if someone looks at you wrong and you feel threatened by it, kill em." He said he wasn't writting any letters to families saying "the Rules of Engagement" killed you loved one.

Posted by: Michael Burt on June 20, 2008 3:45PM EST Colonels? We very seldom saw anyone above twin bars while in the crapper. Even Majors seldom wandered beyond base camps. We trusted our Capt's, & our Louie's if they survived six months. Mostly our forces were led by Capt's & SFC's. That's who you listened to if you wanted to go back to the world. I guess today's military is different, what with all the training & gear. After AIT I never rode in a vehicle once, except the busses that ran out of the airfields. Is a helo a "vehicle"? :-)

Posted by: robertF on June 20, 2008 4:01PM EST Heck ya a helo is a vehicle, it is more dangerous than anything with wheels. I was only on a Chinook once. I am a maintenance guy. Our LTC was the first one out of the gate.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 20, 2008 4:35PM EST Rob--you're absolutely right, most people don't understand the whole command thing. Yep, the Chairman of the JCS doesn't have forces...those belong to the geographic Combatant Commander (Fallon was one such individual--Commander of CENTCOM, and previously PACOM). Things have changed lots over the years, even since I joined up in 1989 as a young enlisted guy. Oh yeah...I rode an SH-3 Sea King into Turkey once. Roughest ride I've ever had.

Posted by: renko on June 22, 2008 3:42PM EST Mike O, 'Ultimately realizing that it would happen with or without him, he planned an attack he felt would most likely succeed. He was forced to gamble on a losing hand.' --One thing about Yamamoto which is also pertinent to the iraqi sit'n, he *knew* japan couldn't win vs. the US, and had shared why. He was under no illusions about the size and resources behind our inevitable response; his statement was: "I can run wild (in the pacific) for a year, perhaps 18 months." His hope was that the army could sufficiently fortify *their* position, that the US would eventually accept a treaty leaving Japan in control of china, if no where else. Where this touches iraq is that State held that iraq had no history or prospect of coalescing into a stable nat'n. Defense knew that much larger troop numbers were req'd to pacify the country. CIA knew that the triple split of ethnicity/religion were an unstable mix, generally antagonistic towards the others. ALL of these institutions and their experience/advice were ignored in the runup and execution of the war. Bitterly, when the sit'n went south, *they* were ordered to "stick their necks into the meatgrinder" (ala Libby), and accept the blame. After seeing what happened to Shinseki, then V.Plame, it's at least understandable that many of these sen. officers held their tongues until retirement, then voiced their opinions (much like mcclellan). (As an afterthought, it's the apex of hypocrisy that the same admin, and its' water-carriers/apologists, that ruthlessly silenced/punished/fired any dissenters to its' policies, NOW cries: why didn't you bring this up before?)

Posted by: renko on June 22, 2008 3:49PM EST Fly, To Fallon, I'd add gen. Karpinski, who was in charge of AbuG when the torture began; she kept her mouth shut during the investigations, then was ultimately found partially accountable. And gen Taguba, who was charged w/ investigating it; congress (gop controlled at the time) took only specific portions of his report, declared that responsibility fell only on relatively low ranking military personnel, and declared the upper chain of command blameless. NOW, after retirement, he has been giving his unconstrained opinion of what he found (torture) being ordered from on high. What I wouldn't give for his full report to be declassified, appendices and all.

Posted by: renko on June 22, 2008 4:08PM EST John, "I see the concern that Shinseki had about numbers, however I wonder if the administration had told the truth about how many warriors they would need. Would Congress have supported any Iraq related intentions?" Allow me to rephrase the question: If congress had been told the truth, would they have agreed to the admin's request for war-authority on iraq? I suspect the answer is clearly no: recall the exaggerations and lies about wmd; recall the 80 billion cost estimate (which the iraqis would pay for; the treas official who speculated as much as 200billion was fired); recall the iraq/AQ lies (which the admin knew weren't true). The sad fact is that the congress voted for the AUMF b/c they were given false info, false threats, and deflated cost projections. As for a long, drawn-out anti-terrorist war, wouldn't it seem wise to fight the terrorists where they are, rather than destabilize another nat'n (which wasn't a threat to the US) and subsequently invite-in/create more terrorists, thereby opening a second front?

Posted by: renko on June 22, 2008 4:12PM EST fly, IIRC, Powell and Armitage were both working state, during the invasion planning and execution; it's been well documented that they were excluded and/or marginalized. This admin allowed only true-believers into the inner circle; dissenters were fired (or ignored, if they couldn't be conveniently fired, like powell/armitage). In effect, their job was to "sell" the war, not plan/execute it.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 22, 2008 4:56PM EST Renko-- Yes, Powell and Armitage were marginalized, primarily by Rumsfeld & Cheney. You mentioned McClellan, who's criticized the administration in his new book. True, but it's after the fact. General Taguba did a thorough investigation, and was marginalized and fired for exposing the truth. In other words, Taguba was marginalized for doing a good job. (Side note: I've attended one of Taguba's ethics panels at the Naval War College, and he's truly a brilliant man and talented general officer). Although similar, McClellan isn't a military officer. He was an appointed press secretary. You could also make the same comparison to George Tenet, the former CIA director. Tenet claims in his book that he warned the President about the questionable validity of some WMD intel reports... yet never resigned under any protest. As a matter of fact, I think the term "slam dunk" is now attributed to Tenet.

Posted by: Mike Olson on June 23, 2008 4:01PM EST Renko, I appreciate the added insight to both the current situation and the historical analogy I made. I was under the illusion that Yamamoto thought they could win *IF* he could maintain victory for the 1st six months. You're information makes him even more astute than I originally held him to be.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 23, 2008 6:34PM EST Mike-- I'm not so sure. Yamamoto was a brilliant tactician and good strategist, but he erred gravely on the results. Allow me to explain a little... A Pearl Harbor raid was never part of Japanese war plans with the U.S. The Japanese hoped to draw out the U.S. Pacific fleet, get it far from home, and achieve a quick decisive victory, reminiscent of the 1904-1905 success at Tsushima vs. Russia. Upon loosing the fleet, it was though that the U.S. would sue for a settlement, much as Russia had. Yamamoto's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was never even debated amongst the Japanese government. When he launched the surprise attack on Dec 7, he sealed his coffin. It was a tactical victory, but a strategic defeat. In his deep knowledge of American industrial capacity (10 times that of Japan), he failed to take into account the human element. Instantly, he had batted a hornets nest, and made any settlement impossible...the U.S., it's government and citizens were raging mad. On Dec 6, 2/3 of the U.S public and the vast majority of Conressional senators and representatives were vehemently opposed to entering the war. On Dec 8, war was declared with a unanimous Senate vote and only on "nay" in the House. I would argue that the best Japanese strategy would have been to seize the SE Asian resource areas, and simply bypass the Phillipines. That would have forced FDR to try to convince Congress to go to war. At best, it would have been a split vote, with a lot of head-scratching Americans on the public scene, wondering "why?" Had the Navy suffered a defeat or setback, it's possible that pressure would mount at home in the U.S. to settle the dispute. Instead, Yamamoto's attack had the effect of mobilizing the U.S., and the rest is history. Just my two cents...

Posted by: Mike Olson on June 24, 2008 1:18AM EST *FLY*,I would have to say that is a valid observation. I brought in an analogy which I failed to understand completely. I will be very honest, I really don't feel embarrassed by that and I'm glad you guys have brought your knowlege into play. It has been years since I've really studied such things and what was in depth knowlege at that time, is clearly not in depth knowlege now. (Bear in mind most of my study was during jr. high and early high school...I shouldn't have rested on my laurels...so to speak.) But, learning more or considering a more advanced perspective is always a good thing.

Posted by: John T Moeller on June 24, 2008 3:04AM EST Mike : The older I get the more I want to learn....before I go..Don't know what that knowledge will do for me when I get UP there .....He he! Seems that when we were in Highschool and opportunity knocked, we had more important things to confuse us.......like women and sports?

Posted by: Mike Olson on June 24, 2008 12:11PM EST I gotta admit, John, although I participated in both women and sports the greater distraction was by far the former, not so much the latter! : )

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 12:26PM EST You guys have great comments, and that's the point. When it comes to strategy and history, well...I'm cheating. My degrees are in Political Science and History, which a heavy focus on foreign policy and international relations. I've got one trimester left at the Naval War College, which awards a masters in National Security & Strategic Studies. We spend a considerable amount of time studying things like Yamamoto's strategy, and the U.S. plan (Plan Orange). Ultimately, the goals of the War Colleges aren't to make us more war-like, as some might think, but to make us better planners and better strategists on how to deal with the wicked problems that face us today. Please don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to sound self-important, and I hope it doesn't come across that way. It's simply what I do for a living, and it's a good, rewarding job in many ways. How the military works is a foreign concept to many Americans. We've got a professional service, and fewer and fewer veterans out there that have any idea what it's all about. That's the reason I started this group, both to hopefully share my own thoughts, and to learn from others. Having a dialogue helps us see different perspectives, and think about things from angles we may not have thought about. Hopefully, we can shatter a few myths, bring a bit of knowledge to the table, and provide a forum of good discussion.

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 12:31PM EST Fly, "Yamamoto's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was never even debated amongst the Japanese government. " --I might have to refresh my memory, but iirc, while japan *had* a govn, true power lay in the military junta led by togo; w/in that, the army and navy were virtually independent, and outside of logistics, cooperated very little. The army had been at war since 32(?) in china...first mongolia, then china proper. The junta, w/ togo and the army most influential, decided that to create their co-prosperity sphere, they needed to neutralize the brits (and french) in the pacific. As they expected a US response, they decided to neutralize our pacflt and carriers, as you described. Once that had been decided, the navy was tasked w/ the plan/operation, which Yamamoto (despite deep misgivings) did his duty and undertook. As I understood it, there really *was* no other option for their navy. Although, like I said, it's been awhile. If I'm off-base, please correct me (wasn't a naval officer; if you've been through the academy, your naval hx courses must've been way more in depth; mine's just a history buff). I'd appreciate it. That's an interesting point about japan *not* attacking us. We'd already shown that we wouldn't go to war over hitler and europe or hitler and russia. I bet we wouldn't have entered in; if the european conflict wasn't enough to draw the public's concern, then a second, asian conflict would only have further clouded the issue.

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 12:35PM EST fly, well, that cleared that up! Do you have any suggested readings on Yamamoto? It sounds like you could offer good recommendations.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 12:44PM EST Ok, I suppose I should get back to the subject at hand. I've refrained from commenting about Admiral Fallon too much because I wanted to see what other people thought. Actually, Jenius hit the nail on the head in the first post, as did many others. If you're a senior officer (like Shinseki or Fallon), you're duty bound to give the best possible advice that you can to the Commander in Chief. That means pointing out all the risks, dangers, challenges and potential costs...it may even mean the need to educate a leader bout WHY something should or should not be done, and WHY it may cost more than expected. The old adage goes, "Speak truth to power." Well, that's true. If a general or admiral thinks it's a wrong decision, they only really have one viable option: Resign and retire. In the case of the senior officers, job security and retirement isn't an issue. Fallon had 42 years of service, and will retire with 100% of his base pay, I think. You can always push back to your boss (in this case, the president), but if you can't get him to budge, and feel strongly enough about it, then the best course of action is to resign. That way, when the history books are written, you won't be at the wheel of a crashing truck. Generals serve at the leisure of the Commander in Chief. However, the Commander in Chief serves at the leisure of the voters. As Truman said, "the buck stops here." The Commander in Chief will have to live with the success or failure of his decisions, and the voters and congress can hold him accountable. In the end, I think Fallon did the right thing. Fallon is a man who likes to keep disagreements private, between him and the administration. In his view, the ruckus over the article was becoming a distraction, and he felt it was time to step down and move on. Fallon was upset with the article because it brought the schism into the public's eye, where he didn't want it. My sources tell me that Fallon DID push back against the administration, but preferred to do it in private. After enough time, things like that leak out.

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 12:48PM EST Btw, I hope I didn't come across like I was exonerating mclellan. I was pointing to his book and testimony as evidence that much still has to be revealed with what occurred in the wh (good luck). Clarke's testimony about pre-9/11, McNeil's about fiscal recklessness, mcllellan's about the Plame outing, Shinseki's forced retirement, Lindsey's(?) firing after estimating war costs......I was trying to illustrate how anyone not adhering to the party line was tossed overboard. That seemed imprudent, given the magnitude of times, but that's politics, and not history. You met Taguba? Talk about being present at history in the making! (Just a thought; the millenium challenge(?) and VanRiper's performance would be another great topic).

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 1:26PM EST renko, I recommend a book called "A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War," by Murray & Millett. In addition, "And I Was There," by Admiral Edwin T. Layton. You're right, it was a military government in Japan, run primarily by the Army. As an aside, the Army & Navy didn't coordinate efforts, and couldn't work jointly together. As for Yamamoto, here’s what I would add, and I’m borrowing from one of our lectures given by Dr. Lee at the War College: Japan's original war plans involved a political objective: Defend its empire in the Western Pacific and East Asia. Japan envisioned a protracted attrition of the US Navy as it steamed west across the Pacific; then, decisive engagement of the much weakened US fleet in Waters closer to Japan, or perhaps the Marianas. The ideas was to use guerrilla warfare at sea, like a series of ambushes, and lure the US fleet into engagement on terms favorable to Japan. In theory, submarines would start picking away at the U.S. fleet outside Pearl Harbor; and would include land-based air attacks from Japanese-controlled islands in central Pacific; torpedo attacks by cruisers as well as destroyers; carrier aviation in support of battleships; super-battleships to provide overmatching advantage in decisive engagement. As I mentioned, the traditional war plan (which was approved annually by the Emperor), never included a carrier strike vs. Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto objected to the traditional strategy. First of all, it meant protracted war with the U.S., and time would not be on Japan's side. In 1941, the Japanese economy was already under great strain, the U.S. was not (and was in a depression, with much capacity sitting idle). Time would allow the US to convert its vastly superior industrial potential (more than 10X that of Japan!) into overwhelming naval capability. Yamamoto could credibly claim to have a better understanding of the US than any other Japanese naval leader. He had served two tours in the US. He had seen US industrial centers. He had studied the US Civil War. Yamamoto’s plan was different: The political objective was to force the US to agree to a negotiated settlement recognizing Japanese hegemony in “Greater East Asia.” His strategy was to go on the offensive to destroy the US Pacific Fleet, especially its carriers, as quickly as possible; and first strike at Pearl Harbor. This would involved massing Japanese carriers in a multi-carrier task force and yet still achieve surprise. He would take advantage of technological advances in aviation by making carriers, not battleships, the decisive weapon of choice. In a nutshell, Yamamoto’s plan embodied a vision of revolutionary transformation in naval warfare. Yamamoto made some critical assumptions that proved false. First, he assumed a US political reaction: US leaders would come to the view that war against Japan would consume time and resources better devoted to fighting Germany. He also assumed an endgame, which was that the US rational calculation would lead to a negotiated settlement recognizing Japanese hegemony in “Greater East Asia.” So, what really happened? Yamamoto missed the key to thinking strategically. It might sound ironic, because he was a good tactician and strategist, but missed the bigger picture: You must see the connections between military operations and political outcomes. The attack at Pearl Harbor shocked the American people and their political leaders—but not in the way Yamamoto intended! It galvanized, rather than shattered, the will to fight. Divisions over foreign policy between President and Congress disappeared. Isolationism faded into the background. On Dec 8, FDR’s speech to Congress foreshadowed policy of “unconditional surrender.” And that was a bad omen for Japan.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 1:34PM EST renko-- I don't think McClellan was in the middle of things. He was the talking head appointed by the White House, and wasn't part of the National Security apparatus. I'm much more unforgiving of George Tenet. In his after-the-fact book, he claims to have warned the administration about the questionable intel. If he felt so strongly that war couldn't be justified, why didn't he resign under protest?

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 1:41PM EST Thanks, looking forward to reading those. "Dr. Lee at the War College: " Bruce Lee, who wrote "Marching Orders?" (His thesis there would be another great topic for this group). Another great 'what if': how much longer and more difficult would fighting japan've been if we *hadn't* been reading their military codes? Think of all the shipping, resources, and surprise japan would've retained. It would've been a much longer war. And w/ the end of germany and stalin's guarantee to join in the fight vs. japan, it would've been another soviet satellite, like eastern europe. (which would've made our losing korea a forgone conclusion. which would've made fighting vietnam far more difficult).

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 1:58PM EST I suspect tenet's name will forever be mud at the CIA. I've read of at least one anonymous star added to their wall early in bush's first term. Lord knows the blowback, in lives and assets, from outing Plame and revealing Brewster-Jennings as a CIA front (that's still classified under the guise of nat'l security). About tenet, I wholeheartedly agree: he owed it to his people to resign when it became obvious that the facts were being fixed around the policy of invading iraq. He should've resigned over the admin's stonewalling the 9/11-committee; or over outing Plame; or over allowing his agency to shoulder the blame. tenet was a complete toady, when a truth-to-power type was sorely needed. He's not an honorable man, imo. mclellan should've resigned when he realized that he was being lied to and used by rove and cheney. (I go back and forth as to his current motives: financial gain or conscious-clearing; I don't know enough to judge, at this time). I'm surprised powell did not resign when he learned he'd been fed lies to spout at the UN. Given his military career and pedigree, I was surprised he didn't when the full effect of iraq on the military became apparent).

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 2:58PM EST Powell did resign. He did it quietly, in the form of bowing out after Bush's first 4 years. Tenet wasn't a bad man, nor was he disliked at the Agency. His critical fault was his failure to assert himself as the voice of intelligence in the Administration. For a short read, you can look at the book review on Amazon under Tenet's Book, "At the eye of the Storm," or something like that. Hard to theorize about what the war would have been like if we hadn't had the ability to read the Japanese codes. It would have been more difficult, if nothing else.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 3:01PM EST Since I'm a nerdy guy who likes quotes, I thought I'd share this: "Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of plans; it is not the carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; to use a dreadful cliche, it performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well informed; its job is to stand behind them with the book opened at the right page to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting, and—at their request—to analyze alternative courses without indicating choice." –Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy It's my view that ultimately, George Tenet failed in this endeavor. If he held his ground and still failed go get the point across, he should have resigned. That sends a powerful message.

Posted by: renko on June 24, 2008 5:40PM EST whoops. Power outage. I find it hard to give tenet credit. There's a difference between being a milquetoast from a toady. I'll try to read his bk. Good quote. (btw, *was* the lecturer Bruce Lee?)

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 25, 2008 10:11AM EST Nope, not Bruce Lee, but that would have been cool!

Posted by: renko on June 26, 2008 5:12PM EST In that case, check out his book: Marching Orders. (If you haven't read it already). He's a military historian, who applied the partial declassification of the ww2 ultra, purple, and enigma materials to various battles and strategies, trying to divine what effect they had. Fascinating book. (The DavLib carries a copy).

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 27, 2008 9:44AM EST I'll have to check it out!

Posted by: renko on June 27, 2008 1:09PM EST From a Galloway oped of Taguba: " Maj. Gen. Anthony Taguba would undergo his own trial by fire when, in 2004, he was named by the Pentagon to conduct a carefully walled-in investigation of the abuses of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. By regulation — and no doubt by the design of those who appointed him — Taguba could not investigate any uniformed or civilian official whose rank was higher than his own two stars." http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/41772.html The comments are notable for adding some other generals to the dissenters list.

Posted by: Michael Burt on June 29, 2008 12:14PM EST This was a fine discussion, but is it really pertinent to today? I think it's accepted by most that the military end of things has acquitted itself well, with some exceptions. But what is happening now seems more pressing to me. Solving what "coulda/shoulda/woulda" seems a classroom exercise, not a study of what is needed hear & now. For me, as you get older you are less patient with history, more into the present/immediate future. renko, if 1000 generals come out tomorrow & badmouth anything, they will only disgrace themselves, because the time to speak was when it was happening, not years later. Same with DC & WhiteHouse crap, IMO.

Posted by: Jenius on July 1, 2008 10:59AM EST There is a new Seymour Hersch article in the New Yorker that mentions Fallon, and discussions on Iran. I haven't finished it yet but it might make for a good discussion here. www.newyorker.com

Posted by: renko on July 1, 2008 12:32PM EST Another recent article about iran and the skewing of facts: Ex-Agent Says CIA Ignored Iran Facts A former CIA operative says he tried to warn the agency about faulty intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs.....he alleges that CIA officials also ignored evidence that Iran had suspended work on a nuclear bomb. " the former officer contends that his 22-year CIA career collapsed after he questioned CIA doctrine about the nuclear programs of Iraq and Iran. As a native of the Middle East and a fluent speaker of both Farsi and Arabic, he had been assigned undercover work in the Persian Gulf region, where he successfully recruited an informant with access to sensitive information about Iran's nuclear program, Krieger said. The informant provided secret evidence that Tehran had halted its research into designing and building a nuclear weapon. Yet, when the operative sought to file reports on the findings, his attempts were "thwarted by CIA employees,"......and later was told to "remove himself from any further handling" of the informant. In the months after the conflict, the operative became the target of two internal investigations....and in both cases the allegations of wrongdoing were never substantiated. CIA spokesman declined to comment on the specifics of the case but rejected the allegation that the agency had suppressed reports. "It would be wrong to suggest that agency managers direct their officers to falsify the intelligence they collect or to suppress it for political reasons," he said. "That's not our policy. That's not what we're about." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/30/AR2008063001940

Posted by: Michael Burt on July 1, 2008 3:43PM EST I don't care what his job was, his or anyone's first responsibility is to the Constitution, which means the people of America. If those higher up are committing crimes, & won't self-enforce laws, then the employee in the know has an obligation to report any known transgressions, that includes the military. Failure to make immediate reports equals breaking the same laws. Reporting superiors wrongdoing is not "snitching", it is doing whats right. So I don't care what "EX" agents/generals/press secretaries say now. Too little, too late. IMO.

Posted by: renko on July 2, 2008 2:56PM EST It *is* too little, too late. But it is something. And it is necessary. One of the more dishonorable practices from bush's yrs, has been the politicization of govn functions. It's traditional for the winning wh party to replace the top layer of political appointees; bush/cheney have taken that to a whole other level of extremity. Witness the politicization of DoJ hiring. Or, worse, the firing of gop AUAttorneys after 06 b/c they wouldn't press weak/nonexistant cases against dems....or drop cases against gop members.

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 6:28PM EST Colin Powell was simply left out ot the loop or overruled by Cheney who undercut everything Powell said. They tricked Powell into making the speech to the UN using "intelligence' that came from one questionable source by telling Powell the case was a "slam dunk" and the compilation of reports from numerous sources. He refused to resign hoping he'd be able to get through to Bush and knew if he left, the neo-cons would have no opposition. Condi Rice failed powell and the President. I think a prompt resignation would have signaled his disapproval, but they led him on till they no longer needed him and any disapproval demonstrated by his resignation was fait accompli.

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 9:41PM EST Of course Powell was Sec of State but qualified to run the State Dept and the Dept of Defense. But how about Graham's interrogation of Abizaid? He tells the Committe we'll need 400,000 troops to secure Iraq against a variety of situations that could develop after an easy defeat of the Republican Guard. Rumsfeld gets busy and refutes this claim, just can't imagine why it would take more troops to secure than it does to succeed in the invasion. I imagine Abizaid was let go; I don't recall, but I know nobody needs to resign with the neo-cons. They lop off disagreeing heads and find one that's congenial to their ideas.

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 9:50PM EST Fly - We had an Admiral aboard the frigate I was on, ComCruDesFlot Something, Rear Admiral. A single bridge, so he's got a chair portside in the pilot house, always an orderly, though not a Marine, and a steward's mate close at hand. He hates the ship. It rides too rough in the weather, and I'm thinking he wants his own bridge on a BIG ship. He was a grim son-of-a-gun with icy blue eyes and chiseled features with facial liver spots. One of my failures as QMOW in ops in the Caribbean was to fail to record latitude and longitude in the Notebook when we came across this fool on a raft in high seas. It was unbelievable to see him close alongside, the Captain trying to talk him into coming aboard. The Admiral wasn't concerned. we had a rendezvous, so we steamed off. I always wondered what happened to him.

Posted by: reuther on July 9, 2008 12:43PM EST We put the guy and his raft in the lee of the ship. The Captain used a bullhorn to talk to him. The sea was so high our rolling had us looking down on him from extreme angles, back and forward. I always thought of it as an event of significance justifying recording in the QM's Notebook. As far as his position goes for purposes of a rescue that he declined, the plot on the chart would have provided location at the time he was spotted but they couldn't have found even the time in my record of the watch. I almost have to believe the CO was tempted to call the Coast Guard. The CO was a very special guy, Annapolis, religious - held services for Protestants on the mess decks himself at sea - and I know he felt a great personal concern for the rafter. Why a man would take a raft to sea in that weather is the Question.

Posted by: reuther on July 12, 2008 11:43AM EST The waves were huge and seem even bigger when you're virtually dead in the water. The guy and his raft were on a "hillside" of water. Do I have to join the Security Club to hear back?

Posted by: reuther on July 21, 2008 6:59AM EST I couldn't sleep this morning. My mind just leapt around in time entertaining itself while depriving me of sleep. This memory occurred to me and might interest both FLY and Navy Nurse Anne-Marie. I fell sick during service week in Basic. They called it acute pharyingitis and I took a bunk in sickbay with others with the similar illnesses with high temperatures. The corpsmen kept us in oral antibiotics, and one day a nurse came in to give us injections in the hip that required exposure of the buttocks. One sailor obviously from the South repeatedly refused to allow the nurse to give him the shot. His upbringing gave him a strong regard for privacy, and her increasingly insistent instructions to pull down his "bottoms" we're met with equally insistent "No, Ma'ams!" She was a commissioned officer. Another sailor and I just cracked up laughing finding a release in the laughter for pent-up emotion related to our first lengthy absences from home I guess, and our outbursts offered her a way to avoid the insubordination in the situation. She ordered us out of our bunks for a good "dressing down" and the Southern gentleman preserved his honor. A medical corpsman gave him his shot.

Posted by: protester on July 24, 2008 9:01PM EST As I recall a brilliant General named MacArthur once challenged a President, Truman, and was soon handed his hat. Some of our best Generals, Patton comes to mind, have been mavericks, but most, like Bradley, are conformists. Sometimes, towing the line is a good thing, but a really good General convinces the line to tow him. Eisenhower comes to mind.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on August 4, 2008 8:21AM EST MacArthur was openly insubordinate, and Truman did the right thing by firing him. In the case of the current administration, there's a trend of firing senior people who give professional advice that doesn't jive with the party line or ideology. That's dangerous, since you'll wind up with a bunch of "yes" men (or women) working for you.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on August 6, 2008 10:41AM EST reuther--sorry, I was out for a while, but did read your posts. Always great hearing from you!

Posted by: reuther on August 12, 2008 3:33AM EST Fly - I read somewhere that an early experience with a Democratic president caused MacArthur (rightly or wrongly) to mistrust Democratic presidents in general. I'll have to check back on recent reading to get specifics. Have been reading some fiction, Fly. Helped someone find Leslie M. Silko's "Ceremony" in a local bookstore and decided to read it myself. Good book, dark view of mankind with a scene right out of Golding's "Lord of the Flies." Then in Newsweek or Time I read where one of my favorite writers, Louise Erdrich, put "Winter in the Blood" by James Welch on her list of 5 most influential books. This book I'm having trouble with. Has to be an attempt to imitate Kafka and it's not going well, but halfway through I'm trusting to Erdrich's judgment and hoping for something special yet. Hope all is well with the Fly family!

Posted by: reuther on August 12, 2008 11:44AM EST In a biography of FDR by the late Roy Jenkins, the author refers to MacArthur "indulging in a somewhat hysterical face-to-face confrontation with Roosevelt" over budget cuts in defense. This confrontation "was the beginning of (MacArthur's) alienation from Democratic presidents that culminated in his sacking by Truman 18 years later." (Henry Holt, 2003, p.78)

Posted by: reuther on August 18, 2008 8:53AM EST I dilly-dallied too much in the reading of the book but found it worthwhile as an attempt by a Native American to describe his inner life and to portray reservation life. WE are the children of immigrants. This land was theirs at one time. "Winter in the Blood" - James Welch. A'Brow' is the term for the "gangplank," right? Officers forward brow, enlisted, aft?