Quadsville

Posted by: Volunteer on June 18, 2008 9:51AM CST I'll start. In most cases (military or civilian), the proper course would be to voice your opinion within and try to change or improve the policies. If you disagree with the final decision, you either leave or obey. The caveat to that would be in a 'whistleblower' situation, where you see things that are illegal, unethical, etc., and feel the need to go outside the chain of command or, if you feel it is dangerous enough, to the press. I don't remember the Fallon details. Was he giving a talk when he mentioned his disagreements? It's hard to say that he was right or wrong, given this administration's disturbing history of getting rid of people who express different opinions from the party line.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 18, 2008 11:23AM CST The details on Fallon are highlighted in the Esquire article. It's a good read. Thanks for the thoughts, Jenius!

Posted by: Anne-Marie Hislop on June 18, 2008 6:09PM CST Interesting question. I think that a military officer owes a certain loyalty in addition to the fact that it is career suicide to not be faithful, so I would not see going to the press as an early option. Hopefully, he/she has an internal moral code with lines that he/she will not cross even if it costs a career, reputation etc (we all should have such an internal moral code - some things should be unacceptable to us no matter the cost). That said, obviously what to do in opposing a policy would depend upon where it falls in relation to those core values. Assuming whatever it is does not cross swords with that internal nonnegotiable code, my first preference is working within the system. For one thing, that is the only way we may actually change or modify the system. When I was in the Navy our chief Nurse, a Cdr issued an order saying that all corpsmen would be removed from pediatrics and the femal wards - only corpswaves would work on those wards. As the charge nurse in Pediatrics I felt it was important to have that male influence around for children whose daddy's were often at sea. So, I went to her office and made the case - she reversed her order in relation to pediatrics. If working within the system gets nowhere, then it seems to me that the course of action would depend of what the issue was, how profoundly one feels about it, and whether or not one is compromised by not doing something. There is something in me that does not see going to the press as a very desirable option - but then I never was a senior officer (ltjg was as high as I got).

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 18, 2008 10:12PM CST AMH-- Just to toss a different angle to the conversation... It doesn't have to be the press. In the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, there was strong concern amongst military planners, generals & admirals about how many troops would be needed. The vast amount of intellectual research, war-gaming and simulations, etc, indicated that upwards of 350,000 troops would be needed...not just for the combat, but to secure the country. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Perle and company all pooh-poohed that number as nonsense. Of course, none of them had any real military experience with such planning. General Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army before the 2003 war, was put on the spot by Congress. During congressional testimony, he was directly asked what he thought an adequate number of troops would be. He responded honestly, that he thought 300+ thousand would be required. He had his pink slip almost as soon as he got back to his desk at the pentagon. He was put in a tough situation, where congressional lawmakers demanded answers. Shinseki has been accused of not being vocal enough, and also the converse, of subverting the administration's agenda.

Posted by: John Moeller on June 18, 2008 11:19PM CST I see the concern that Shinseki had about numbers, however I wonder if the administration had told the truth about how many warriors they would need. Would Congress have supported any Iraq related intentions? Wasn't Rumsfelds original (buzz) he wanted to rehape the military, so that they could "drop in" anywhere in the world, meaning reliance on an airborne tactical American Force drop? I'm not saying Bush was right or wrong as commander in chief, but in a long protracted anti-terrorist war, does a Commander have the right if possible to pick the field of battle. for example sand over mountains? I realize Iraq soverignity is an issue however.... I finally had a chance to see the DVD "Truman" this week and the Key words of the early 40's were Korea, Japan, Israel, and Iran. And many though Truman "had it all wrong" also, with his very low public approval.

Posted by: Volunteer on June 19, 2008 10:29AM CST It's a tough situation for people like Fallon and Shinseki - what do you do when you disagree with your leaders or, worse, if you believe that they are not being honest with the public. It's easy to say "suck it up or leave", but these, as well as others down the line, are people with honorable careers that outlast good and bad administrations. The Shinseki case seems a little more straightforward. I don't see any circumstances where he should lie under oath. It's another black mark on this administration that he was essentially fired for telling the truth.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 10:44AM CST JTM-- The Commander and his staff are responsible for the planning and assessment of military operations. Ultimately, the Commander in Chief has final say. In this administration, there were only two senior officials with senior military experience: Powell and Armitage. Both are now gone. Both understood the complexities and requirements of an occupation. Mike-- Yep, the way you handle such this differs depending on your rank & paygrade. Jenius--Great comments. You're right, there is a track record of the current administration to stifle any dissent, whether it be internal or external.

Posted by: John Moeller on June 19, 2008 11:09AM CST Jenius : "It's easy to say "suck it up or leave", but these, as well as others down the line, are people with honorable careers that outlast good and bad administrations."...... I think we would all agree, thiis could also apply to a Deere employee with 15 years seniority and a family to feed. In the end a lot will depend on how much failure you can live with if a person did go public, but you also drag along family and friends when speaking out turns political in or out of the Armed Forces....Good morning all!

Posted by: Sanity on June 19, 2008 12:57PM CST There seem to be several observations or underlying questions, but first off I will admit I admire but lack the military discipline regarding chain of command, authority, etc. I am too inquisitive in the public sector to not question decisions by 'management', also because of the 'fly by the seat of our pants' style I've witnessed in the public sector. But anyway, There is a difference between high level decisions and low level implementation of those decisions. If the one who has to implement the solution does not agree with the solution, what to do? I don't like the 'use the media'. Unless one is completely sure how wrong something is, using the media seems like 'crying just to get your own way'. But it is hard to keep ones mouth shut. Stepping aside may save you from personally being responsible for the fall out. Overall, I think it more valuable for the right person to stay in the position to deal with the problems they foresee will happen, rather than turn it over to who doesn't see the problem or maybe doesn't recognize the problem once it happens. Does that make sense? I am often confronted with 'solutions' that have known problems. At times, I know a job will get done, even though I knew how to get there 'easier'. But these experiences have nothing to do with lives and mucho money. I don't think I could make those kind of decisions. Side question: How much criticism was there about Fallon before it came to this point? I mean, were there any articles as flattering about Fallon before it came to a point of butting heads with Bush? This is more of my theoretical "How do you recognize the 'great' guys before it is too late" I'm still reading the article but wanted to get started here. I am at a loss on the "getting fired for telling the truth" but I haven't fully formed my questions on that point. Maybe later

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 1:04PM CST JTM-- Good point, and I'd certainly apply that to junior and mid grade military members. When it comes to flag & general officers, they're well beyond the 20-year mark, and can retire with their pensions...and they usually don't have any problem finding employment. For a bit more historical context: In October, 1990, the CENTCOM staff under GEN Schwarzkopf had planned & war-gamed for potential offensive operations into Kuwait vs. the Iraqi army. Schwarzkopf was unhappy with the results, because it necessitated an up-the-middle attack into Kuwait. Schwarzkopf and his planners had envisioned the "left hook," in which a large force would rapidly cut across open desert, and cut east, cutting the Iraqis off at Basrah. The only problem: He'd need an entire extra corps to do it. That mean roughly doubling the size of the existing force at the time in Saudi Arabia to about 500,000 troops. Schwarzkopf presented the idea to Powell, and they were unsure of what political and domestic impact that might have. With a bit of trepidation, they did the right thing, and presented the request to Pres. Bush (Sr). Bush the elder didn't bat an eye, and said, "ok." Bush was loathe to second guess his 4-star experts, or hamstring them in their duties, and was interested in making sure they had everything they needed. On the flip side, there's Rumsfeld. He wanted to apply the same tactics used in Afghanistan to Iraq...small, special forces supported by air power. Problem is that Iraq is NOT Afghanistan. Rumsfeld uses a business model, looking at efficiency, and doing the job with the least amount of stuff required. That might work in corporate America, but it doesn't work well in Military operations, where the unpredictable nature of human beings comes into play. A Commander must always prepare for what we call "branches and sequels" to the operation. After all, the enemy gets a vote.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 1:08PM CST Sanity-- Fallon is no wimp. He's a true warrior, has seen plenty of combat himself, and is an imposing figure. He also has a keen mind, and understands the increasing need of proactive diplomacy, engagement, and establishing relationships. In Fallon's view, if we come to the point of needing to use force, we've failed in our deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance tasks. Sun Tzu, one of the greatest military minds ever to have lived, remarked that "The ultimate excellence is to defeat the enemy without fighting."

Posted by: Anne-Marie Hislop on June 19, 2008 7:22PM CST I agree that being called to testify under oath requires the truth. What has been said about risking career, retirement, and future choices is valid. My belief is that one should have some nonnegotiables (lines we won't cross) no matter the cost to us. That said, I do think that the first option is to work within the system. I read some of the article on Fallon (didn't have time to read all). He sounds like an amazing man - what I did not understand is whether he was doing his ordinary job or whether he was doing diplomacy work because no one else was doing it. [Obviously the article is very anti-administration biased, which should be kept in mind in evaluating it - whether we agree with that perspective or not].

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 19, 2008 7:45PM CST AMH-- As the CENTCOM Combatant Commander, he was in charge of U.S. Military affairs in the entire CENTCOM region. The meeting-and-greeting, diplomacy and face time with foreign leaders and military officers is an expected duty for a 4-Star that has one of the regional commands in our system. Originally, he'd planned to retire following his tenure as the Pacific Command (PACOM), but the SECDEF asked him to do one more tour, and take the CENTCOM job.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 20, 2008 11:44AM CST Robert-- Thanks for your input! Funny you mention Sanchez. I'd agree, he was a victim of circumstance and poor planning. By all accounts, he was a great division commander. I've never met him personally. Here's an excerpt from the book "Fiasco," written by Thomas Ricks. It highlights what you said about "being thrown under the bus." "...Sanchez was placed in the middle of an extraordinarily difficult and tangled command situation. In other U.S. occupations, the commander had been a four-star general, such as Doublas MacArthur in postwar Japan, and Lucius Clay at the same time in Germany. Sanchez was a three star--that is, a lieutenant general--and in fact the most junior one in the U.S. Army. He jumped from commanding a division of fewer than 20,000 troops to leading a combined U.S. and Allied force of about 180,000 men and women. And in doing so he was woefully undersupported--the Pentagon calculated that he needed a headquarters staff of 1,400 but during 2003 he was given a fraction of that, at one point hitting a low of just 495. "The whole staffing of CJTF-7 (the new name for Sanchez's command, the top U.S. military headquarters in Iraq) at the time was completely inadequate," said an Army colonel who worked with it in Iraq and later, while at the Army War College, studied its troubles. "Putting a division commander in charge of a corps [a group of divisions, support units, and staffs], then giving him responsibility for a whole country in the throes of an insurgency, multinational forces, an army corps, a MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force], et cetera, with the staff for a single corps was too broad a mandate. No commander with Sanchez's experience level and resources should have been saddled with this responsibility." That understaffing was symptomatic of a far larger problem: Sanches was working for a chain of command [read Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith] that was laboring under a series of false assumptions about postwar Iraq, and that didn't understand the situation it was facing, so it was consistently underestimating the difficulties it faced, and the resources it would need to devote to the problem. On top of that, he was burdened by a jerry-rigged command structure, in which there was no one American official, civilian or military, on the ground in Iraq in charge of the overall American effort. Rather, both Sanchez and Bremer reported up to Rumsfeld, who was at the Pentagon, some 7,000 miles away. (End Quotation) I think Ricks' analysis is accurate. Rumsfeld's construct violates one of the cardinal rules and universal principles of military operations: Unity of Command. This brings me back to my original point, that many of these decisions are not made by senior officers, but politicians. So, as a general or admiral, what do you do when your boss' plan is poorly inept?

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 20, 2008 3:35PM CST Rob--you're absolutely right, most people don't understand the whole command thing. Yep, the Chairman of the JCS doesn't have forces...those belong to the geographic Combatant Commander (Fallon was one such individual--Commander of CENTCOM, and previously PACOM). Things have changed lots over the years, even since I joined up in 1989 as a young enlisted guy. Oh yeah...I rode an SH-3 Sea King into Turkey once. Roughest ride I've ever had.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 22, 2008 3:56PM CST Renko-- Yes, Powell and Armitage were marginalized, primarily by Rumsfeld & Cheney. You mentioned McClellan, who's criticized the administration in his new book. True, but it's after the fact. General Taguba did a thorough investigation, and was marginalized and fired for exposing the truth. In other words, Taguba was marginalized for doing a good job. (Side note: I've attended one of Taguba's ethics panels at the Naval War College, and he's truly a brilliant man and talented general officer). Although similar, McClellan isn't a military officer. He was an appointed press secretary. You could also make the same comparison to George Tenet, the former CIA director. Tenet claims in his book that he warned the President about the questionable validity of some WMD intel reports... yet never resigned under any protest. As a matter of fact, I think the term "slam dunk" is now attributed to Tenet.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 23, 2008 5:34PM CST Mike-- I'm not so sure. Yamamoto was a brilliant tactician and good strategist, but he erred gravely on the results. Allow me to explain a little... A Pearl Harbor raid was never part of Japanese war plans with the U.S. The Japanese hoped to draw out the U.S. Pacific fleet, get it far from home, and achieve a quick decisive victory, reminiscent of the 1904-1905 success at Tsushima vs. Russia. Upon loosing the fleet, it was though that the U.S. would sue for a settlement, much as Russia had. Yamamoto's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was never even debated amongst the Japanese government. When he launched the surprise attack on Dec 7, he sealed his coffin. It was a tactical victory, but a strategic defeat. In his deep knowledge of American industrial capacity (10 times that of Japan), he failed to take into account the human element. Instantly, he had batted a hornets nest, and made any settlement impossible...the U.S., it's government and citizens were raging mad. On Dec 6, 2/3 of the U.S public and the vast majority of Conressional senators and representatives were vehemently opposed to entering the war. On Dec 8, war was declared with a unanimous Senate vote and only on "nay" in the House. I would argue that the best Japanese strategy would have been to seize the SE Asian resource areas, and simply bypass the Phillipines. That would have forced FDR to try to convince Congress to go to war. At best, it would have been a split vote, with a lot of head-scratching Americans on the public scene, wondering "why?" Had the Navy suffered a defeat or setback, it's possible that pressure would mount at home in the U.S. to settle the dispute. Instead, Yamamoto's attack had the effect of mobilizing the U.S., and the rest is history. Just my two cents...

Posted by: John Moeller on June 24, 2008 2:04AM CST Mike : The older I get the more I want to learn....before I go..Don't know what that knowledge will do for me when I get UP there .....He he! Seems that when we were in Highschool and opportunity knocked, we had more important things to confuse us.......like women and sports?

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 11:26AM CST You guys have great comments, and that's the point. When it comes to strategy and history, well...I'm cheating. My degrees are in Political Science and History, which a heavy focus on foreign policy and international relations. I've got one trimester left at the Naval War College, which awards a masters in National Security & Strategic Studies. We spend a considerable amount of time studying things like Yamamoto's strategy, and the U.S. plan (Plan Orange). Ultimately, the goals of the War Colleges aren't to make us more war-like, as some might think, but to make us better planners and better strategists on how to deal with the wicked problems that face us today. Please don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to sound self-important, and I hope it doesn't come across that way. It's simply what I do for a living, and it's a good, rewarding job in many ways. How the military works is a foreign concept to many Americans. We've got a professional service, and fewer and fewer veterans out there that have any idea what it's all about. That's the reason I started this group, both to hopefully share my own thoughts, and to learn from others. Having a dialogue helps us see different perspectives, and think about things from angles we may not have thought about. Hopefully, we can shatter a few myths, bring a bit of knowledge to the table, and provide a forum of good discussion.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 11:44AM CST Ok, I suppose I should get back to the subject at hand. I've refrained from commenting about Admiral Fallon too much because I wanted to see what other people thought. Actually, Jenius hit the nail on the head in the first post, as did many others. If you're a senior officer (like Shinseki or Fallon), you're duty bound to give the best possible advice that you can to the Commander in Chief. That means pointing out all the risks, dangers, challenges and potential costs...it may even mean the need to educate a leader bout WHY something should or should not be done, and WHY it may cost more than expected. The old adage goes, "Speak truth to power." Well, that's true. If a general or admiral thinks it's a wrong decision, they only really have one viable option: Resign and retire. In the case of the senior officers, job security and retirement isn't an issue. Fallon had 42 years of service, and will retire with 100% of his base pay, I think. You can always push back to your boss (in this case, the president), but if you can't get him to budge, and feel strongly enough about it, then the best course of action is to resign. That way, when the history books are written, you won't be at the wheel of a crashing truck. Generals serve at the leisure of the Commander in Chief. However, the Commander in Chief serves at the leisure of the voters. As Truman said, "the buck stops here." The Commander in Chief will have to live with the success or failure of his decisions, and the voters and congress can hold him accountable. In the end, I think Fallon did the right thing. Fallon is a man who likes to keep disagreements private, between him and the administration. In his view, the ruckus over the article was becoming a distraction, and he felt it was time to step down and move on. Fallon was upset with the article because it brought the schism into the public's eye, where he didn't want it. My sources tell me that Fallon DID push back against the administration, but preferred to do it in private. After enough time, things like that leak out.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 12:26PM CST renko, I recommend a book called "A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War," by Murray & Millett. In addition, "And I Was There," by Admiral Edwin T. Layton. You're right, it was a military government in Japan, run primarily by the Army. As an aside, the Army & Navy didn't coordinate efforts, and couldn't work jointly together. As for Yamamoto, here’s what I would add, and I’m borrowing from one of our lectures given by Dr. Lee at the War College: Japan's original war plans involved a political objective: Defend its empire in the Western Pacific and East Asia. Japan envisioned a protracted attrition of the US Navy as it steamed west across the Pacific; then, decisive engagement of the much weakened US fleet in Waters closer to Japan, or perhaps the Marianas. The ideas was to use guerrilla warfare at sea, like a series of ambushes, and lure the US fleet into engagement on terms favorable to Japan. In theory, submarines would start picking away at the U.S. fleet outside Pearl Harbor; and would include land-based air attacks from Japanese-controlled islands in central Pacific; torpedo attacks by cruisers as well as destroyers; carrier aviation in support of battleships; super-battleships to provide overmatching advantage in decisive engagement. As I mentioned, the traditional war plan (which was approved annually by the Emperor), never included a carrier strike vs. Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto objected to the traditional strategy. First of all, it meant protracted war with the U.S., and time would not be on Japan's side. In 1941, the Japanese economy was already under great strain, the U.S. was not (and was in a depression, with much capacity sitting idle). Time would allow the US to convert its vastly superior industrial potential (more than 10X that of Japan!) into overwhelming naval capability. Yamamoto could credibly claim to have a better understanding of the US than any other Japanese naval leader. He had served two tours in the US. He had seen US industrial centers. He had studied the US Civil War. Yamamoto’s plan was different: The political objective was to force the US to agree to a negotiated settlement recognizing Japanese hegemony in “Greater East Asia.” His strategy was to go on the offensive to destroy the US Pacific Fleet, especially its carriers, as quickly as possible; and first strike at Pearl Harbor. This would involved massing Japanese carriers in a multi-carrier task force and yet still achieve surprise. He would take advantage of technological advances in aviation by making carriers, not battleships, the decisive weapon of choice. In a nutshell, Yamamoto’s plan embodied a vision of revolutionary transformation in naval warfare. Yamamoto made some critical assumptions that proved false. First, he assumed a US political reaction: US leaders would come to the view that war against Japan would consume time and resources better devoted to fighting Germany. He also assumed an endgame, which was that the US rational calculation would lead to a negotiated settlement recognizing Japanese hegemony in “Greater East Asia.” So, what really happened? Yamamoto missed the key to thinking strategically. It might sound ironic, because he was a good tactician and strategist, but missed the bigger picture: You must see the connections between military operations and political outcomes. The attack at Pearl Harbor shocked the American people and their political leaders—but not in the way Yamamoto intended! It galvanized, rather than shattered, the will to fight. Divisions over foreign policy between President and Congress disappeared. Isolationism faded into the background. On Dec 8, FDR’s speech to Congress foreshadowed policy of “unconditional surrender.” And that was a bad omen for Japan.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 12:34PM CST renko-- I don't think McClellan was in the middle of things. He was the talking head appointed by the White House, and wasn't part of the National Security apparatus. I'm much more unforgiving of George Tenet. In his after-the-fact book, he claims to have warned the administration about the questionable intel. If he felt so strongly that war couldn't be justified, why didn't he resign under protest?

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 1:58PM CST Powell did resign. He did it quietly, in the form of bowing out after Bush's first 4 years. Tenet wasn't a bad man, nor was he disliked at the Agency. His critical fault was his failure to assert himself as the voice of intelligence in the Administration. For a short read, you can look at the book review on Amazon under Tenet's Book, "At the eye of the Storm," or something like that. Hard to theorize about what the war would have been like if we hadn't had the ability to read the Japanese codes. It would have been more difficult, if nothing else.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 24, 2008 2:01PM CST Since I'm a nerdy guy who likes quotes, I thought I'd share this: "Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of plans; it is not the carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; to use a dreadful cliche, it performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are generally well informed; its job is to stand behind them with the book opened at the right page to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting, and—at their request—to analyze alternative courses without indicating choice." –Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy It's my view that ultimately, George Tenet failed in this endeavor. If he held his ground and still failed go get the point across, he should have resigned. That sends a powerful message.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 25, 2008 9:11AM CST Nope, not Bruce Lee, but that would have been cool!

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on June 27, 2008 8:44AM CST I'll have to check it out!

Posted by: Volunteer on July 1, 2008 9:59AM CST There is a new Seymour Hersch article in the New Yorker that mentions Fallon, and discussions on Iran. I haven't finished it yet but it might make for a good discussion here. www.newyorker.com

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 5:28PM CST Colin Powell was simply left out ot the loop or overruled by Cheney who undercut everything Powell said. They tricked Powell into making the speech to the UN using "intelligence' that came from one questionable source by telling Powell the case was a "slam dunk" and the compilation of reports from numerous sources. He refused to resign hoping he'd be able to get through to Bush and knew if he left, the neo-cons would have no opposition. Condi Rice failed powell and the President. I think a prompt resignation would have signaled his disapproval, but they led him on till they no longer needed him and any disapproval demonstrated by his resignation was fait accompli.

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 8:41PM CST Of course Powell was Sec of State but qualified to run the State Dept and the Dept of Defense. But how about Graham's interrogation of Abizaid? He tells the Committe we'll need 400,000 troops to secure Iraq against a variety of situations that could develop after an easy defeat of the Republican Guard. Rumsfeld gets busy and refutes this claim, just can't imagine why it would take more troops to secure than it does to succeed in the invasion. I imagine Abizaid was let go; I don't recall, but I know nobody needs to resign with the neo-cons. They lop off disagreeing heads and find one that's congenial to their ideas.

Posted by: reuther on July 8, 2008 8:50PM CST Fly - We had an Admiral aboard the frigate I was on, ComCruDesFlot Something, Rear Admiral. A single bridge, so he's got a chair portside in the pilot house, always an orderly, though not a Marine, and a steward's mate close at hand. He hates the ship. It rides too rough in the weather, and I'm thinking he wants his own bridge on a BIG ship. He was a grim son-of-a-gun with icy blue eyes and chiseled features with facial liver spots. One of my failures as QMOW in ops in the Caribbean was to fail to record latitude and longitude in the Notebook when we came across this fool on a raft in high seas. It was unbelievable to see him close alongside, the Captain trying to talk him into coming aboard. The Admiral wasn't concerned. we had a rendezvous, so we steamed off. I always wondered what happened to him.

Posted by: reuther on July 9, 2008 11:43AM CST We put the guy and his raft in the lee of the ship. The Captain used a bullhorn to talk to him. The sea was so high our rolling had us looking down on him from extreme angles, back and forward. I always thought of it as an event of significance justifying recording in the QM's Notebook. As far as his position goes for purposes of a rescue that he declined, the plot on the chart would have provided location at the time he was spotted but they couldn't have found even the time in my record of the watch. I almost have to believe the CO was tempted to call the Coast Guard. The CO was a very special guy, Annapolis, religious - held services for Protestants on the mess decks himself at sea - and I know he felt a great personal concern for the rafter. Why a man would take a raft to sea in that weather is the Question.

Posted by: reuther on July 12, 2008 10:43AM CST The waves were huge and seem even bigger when you're virtually dead in the water. The guy and his raft were on a "hillside" of water. Do I have to join the Security Club to hear back?

Posted by: reuther on July 21, 2008 5:59AM CST I couldn't sleep this morning. My mind just leapt around in time entertaining itself while depriving me of sleep. This memory occurred to me and might interest both FLY and Navy Nurse Anne-Marie. I fell sick during service week in Basic. They called it acute pharyingitis and I took a bunk in sickbay with others with the similar illnesses with high temperatures. The corpsmen kept us in oral antibiotics, and one day a nurse came in to give us injections in the hip that required exposure of the buttocks. One sailor obviously from the South repeatedly refused to allow the nurse to give him the shot. His upbringing gave him a strong regard for privacy, and her increasingly insistent instructions to pull down his "bottoms" we're met with equally insistent "No, Ma'ams!" She was a commissioned officer. Another sailor and I just cracked up laughing finding a release in the laughter for pent-up emotion related to our first lengthy absences from home I guess, and our outbursts offered her a way to avoid the insubordination in the situation. She ordered us out of our bunks for a good "dressing down" and the Southern gentleman preserved his honor. A medical corpsman gave him his shot.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on August 4, 2008 7:21AM CST MacArthur was openly insubordinate, and Truman did the right thing by firing him. In the case of the current administration, there's a trend of firing senior people who give professional advice that doesn't jive with the party line or ideology. That's dangerous, since you'll wind up with a bunch of "yes" men (or women) working for you.

Posted by: Fly on the Wall on August 6, 2008 9:41AM CST reuther--sorry, I was out for a while, but did read your posts. Always great hearing from you!

Posted by: reuther on August 12, 2008 2:33AM CST Fly - I read somewhere that an early experience with a Democratic president caused MacArthur (rightly or wrongly) to mistrust Democratic presidents in general. I'll have to check back on recent reading to get specifics. Have been reading some fiction, Fly. Helped someone find Leslie M. Silko's "Ceremony" in a local bookstore and decided to read it myself. Good book, dark view of mankind with a scene right out of Golding's "Lord of the Flies." Then in Newsweek or Time I read where one of my favorite writers, Louise Erdrich, put "Winter in the Blood" by James Welch on her list of 5 most influential books. This book I'm having trouble with. Has to be an attempt to imitate Kafka and it's not going well, but halfway through I'm trusting to Erdrich's judgment and hoping for something special yet. Hope all is well with the Fly family!

Posted by: reuther on August 12, 2008 10:44AM CST In a biography of FDR by the late Roy Jenkins, the author refers to MacArthur "indulging in a somewhat hysterical face-to-face confrontation with Roosevelt" over budget cuts in defense. This confrontation "was the beginning of (MacArthur's) alienation from Democratic presidents that culminated in his sacking by Truman 18 years later." (Henry Holt, 2003, p.78)

Posted by: reuther on August 18, 2008 7:53AM CST I dilly-dallied too much in the reading of the book but found it worthwhile as an attempt by a Native American to describe his inner life and to portray reservation life. WE are the children of immigrants. This land was theirs at one time. "Winter in the Blood" - James Welch. A'Brow' is the term for the "gangplank," right? Officers forward brow, enlisted, aft?